Competing with asking prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lester, Benjamin; Visschers, Ludo; Wolthoff, Ronald
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Edinburgh; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1846
• 发表日期: 2017-05-01
• 页码: 731-770
• 关键词: Asking prices; posted prices; auctions; competing mechanisms; competitive search

摘要

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that, by using an asking price, sellers both maximize their revenue and implement the efficient outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this equilibrium and use it to explore the implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction prices and allocations.