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作者：Daley, Brendan; Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University
摘要：This paper suggests a novel way to import the approach of axiomatic theories of individual choice into strategic settings and demonstrates the benefits of this approach. We propose both a tractable behavioral model as well as axioms applied to the behavior of the collection of players, focusing first on prisoners' dilemma games. A representation theorem establishes these axioms as the precise behavioral content of the model, and that the model's parameters are (essentially) uniquely identified...
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作者：Fragiadakis, Daniel; Troyan, Peter
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Virginia
摘要：Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment mechanisms implemented in practice are unable to accommodate these constraints. This leads policymakers to resort to ad hoc solutions that eliminat...
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作者：Iijima, Ryota; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper proposes a tractable model that allows us to analyze how agents' perception of relationships with others determines the structures of networks. In our model, agents are endowed with their own multidimensional characteristics and their payoffs depend on the social distance between them. We characterize the clustering coefficient and average path length in stable networks, and analyze how they are related to the way agents measure social distances. The model predicts the small-world p...
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作者：Khan, Mohammed Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Yu, Haomiao; Zhang, Yongchao
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Notre Dame; Toronto Metropolitan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms-large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a single trait in which some Nash equilibrium distributions cannot be induced by the Nash equilibria of the representing LIG, this paper offers three equivalence results that delineate a relationship between...
