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作者：Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey; Stole, Lars A.
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Ottawa; University of Chicago
摘要：We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design delegation literature. The set of equilibria includes those with nondifferentiable payoffs and discontinuous choices, as well as equilibria that ...
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作者：Rocheteau, Guillaume; Weill, Pierre-Olivier; Wong, Tsz-Nga
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We construct a continuous-time new-monetarist economy that displays an endogenous, nondegenerate distribution of money holdings. Properties of equilibria are obtained analytically and equilibria are solved in closed form in a variety of cases. Lump-sum transfers financed with money creation are welfare-enhancing when labor productivity is low whereas regressive transfers approach first best when labor productivity is high and agents are not too impatient. We introduce illiquid government bonds...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Cambridge
摘要：We study a class of chip strategies in repeated games of incomplete information. This class generalizes the strategies studied by Mobius () in the context of a favor-exchange model and the strategies studied in our companion paper, Olszewski and Safronov (). In two-player games, if players have private values and their types evolve according to independent Markov chains, then under very mild conditions on the stage game, the efficient outcome can be approximated by chip-strategy equilibria whe...
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作者：Tsoy, Anton
摘要：In this study, I examine the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation approaches perfect. I characterize the Pareto frontier of the double limits and show that it is efficient, but the surplus split generally differs from the Nash bargaining split. I then construct a double ...
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作者：Ahn, David S.; Echenique, Federico; Saito, Kota
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We investigate stochastic choice when only the average and not the entire distribution of choices is observable, focusing attention on the popular Luce model. Choice is path independent if it is recursive, in the sense that choosing from a menu can be broken up into choosing from smaller submenus. While an important property, path independence is known to be incompatible with continuous choice. The main result of our paper is that a natural modification of path independence, which we call part...
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作者：Deb, Rahul; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We introduce a learning framework in which a principal seeks to determine the ability of a strategic agent. The principal assigns a test consisting of a finite sequence of tasks. The test is adaptive: each task that is assigned can depend on the agent's past performance. The probability of success on a task is jointly determined by the agent's privately known ability and an unobserved effort level that he chooses to maximize the probability of passing the test. We identify a simple monotonicit...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：This paper studies stationaryMarkov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann (2015). We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbit...
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作者：Chavas, Jean-Paul; Menon, Martina; Pagani, Elisa; Perali, Federico
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Verona
摘要：We investigate the relationship between the individual and household indirect utility functions in the context of a collective household model. Our analysis produces new results that explain howthe rule governing the distribution of resources among household members is related to the measurement of household welfare and intra-household inequality. We show that in a collective model of private consumption, income shares are equal to the product of two weights: the Pareto weight and a distributi...
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作者：Kikuchi, Tomoo; Nishimura, Kazuo; Stachurski, John
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Kobe University; Australian National University
摘要：This paper builds coordination costs, transaction costs, and other aspects of the theory of the firm into a production chain model with an infinite number of ex ante identical producers. The equilibrium determines prices, allocations of productive tasks across firms, firmsizes, and the number of active firms. These prices and allocations match several stylized facts on firm boundaries, vertical integration, and division of the value chain.
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constrain...
