Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tsoy, Anton
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2543
• 发表日期: 2018-05-01
• 页码: 869-931
• 关键词: Bargaining delay; alternating offers; incomplete information; private correlated values; Coase conjecture; global games

摘要

In this study, I examine the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation approaches perfect. I characterize the Pareto frontier of the double limits and show that it is efficient, but the surplus split generally differs from the Nash bargaining split. I then construct a double limit that approximates the Nash bargaining split in the ex post surplus, but with a delay. Further, I prove the folk theorem when the range of the buyer's values coincides with the range of the seller's costs: any feasible and individually rational ex ante payoff profile can be approximated by a double limit.