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作者：Waki, Yuichiro; Dennis, Richard; Fujiwara, Ippei
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of Glasgow; Keio University; Australian National University
摘要：This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the new Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem, we find that it is optimal to grant constrained discret...
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作者：Plantin, Guillaume; Shin, Hyun Song
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
摘要：When do flexible exchange rates prevent monetary and financial conditions from spilling over across currencies? We examine a model in which international investors strategically supply capital to a small inflation-targeting economy with flexible exchange rates. For some combination of parameters, the unique equilibrium exhibits the observed empirical feature of prolonged episodes of capital inflows and appreciation of the domestic currency, followed by reversals where capital outflows go hand-...
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作者：Roketskiy, Nikita
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher tournament rankings. I use von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets as a solution. I find stable networks in which agents collaborate only within exclusive groups. Both an absence of intergroup collaboration...
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作者：Bosmans, Kristof; Decancq, Koen; Ooghe, Erwin
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Antwerp; KU Leuven
摘要：We provide an axiomatic justification to aggregate money metrics. The key axiom requires the approval of richer-to-poorer transfers that preserve the overall efficiency of the distribution. This transfer principle-together with the basic axioms of anonymity, continuity, monotonicity, and a version of welfarism-characterizes a standard social welfare function defined over money metric utilities.
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作者：Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton
摘要：An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I pr...
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作者：Phuong Le
作者单位：Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with singleminded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation Vickrey-ClarkeGroves (VCG), that is individually rational, incentive compatible, and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG works by first truncating valuations at budgets, and then implementing standar...
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作者：Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; Llavador, Humberto
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：The case for progressive income taxation is often based on the classic result of Jakobsson, 1976 and Fellman, 1976, according to which progressive and only progressive income taxesin the sense of increasing average tax rates on incomeensure a reduction in income inequality. This result has been criticized on the grounds that it ignores the possible disincentive effect of taxation on work effort, and the resolution of this critique has been a longstanding problem in public finance. This paper p...
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作者：Dutta, Rohan; Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：McGill University; European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Palermo
摘要：We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive compatible plans to best achieve its goals. Unfortunately, equilibria that meet this requirement need not exist. We instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This allows groups to put...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Ranking by rating consists in evaluating the performances of items using exogenous rating functions and ranking these items according to their performance ratings. Any such method is separable: the ordering of two items does not depend on the performances of the remaining items. When performances belong to a finite set, ranking by rating is characterized by separability and a property of consistency; this characterization generalizes to the infinite case under a continuity axiom. Consistency f...
