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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Haifa; University of Haifa
摘要：We investigate a normative theory of incomplete preferences in the context of preliminary screening procedures. We introduce a theory of ranking in the presence of objectively incomparable marginal contributions (apples and oranges). Our theory recommends benchmarking, a method under which an individual is deemed more accomplished than another if and only if she has achieved more benchmarks, or important accomplishments. We show that benchmark rules are characterized by four axioms: transitivi...
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作者：Gallo, Oihane; Inarra, Elena
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：This paper introduces a model of coalition formation with claims. It assumes that agents have claims over the outputs that they could produce by forming coalitions. Outputs are insufficient to meet the claims and are rationed by a rule whose proposals of division induce each agent to rank the coalitions in which she can participate. As a result, a hedonic game of coalition formation emerges. Using resource monotonicity and consistency, we characterize the continuous rationing rules that induce...
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作者：Ke, Rongzhu; Ryan, Christopher Thomas
作者单位：Hong Kong Baptist University; University of Chicago
摘要：Principal-agent models are pervasive in theoretical and applied economics, but their analysis has largely been limited to the first-order approach (FOA), where incentive compatibility is replaced by a first-order condition. This paper presents a new approach to solving a wide class of principal-agent problems that satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property but may fail to meet the requirements of the FOA. Our approach solves the problem via tackling a max-min-max formulation over agent act...
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作者：Frankel, Alex; Kartik, Navin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：How much information should a central bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operational shocks to the effect of monetary policy? We consider a version of the Barro-Gordon credibility problem in which monetary policy signals an inflation-biased CB's private information on both these dimensions. We find that greater CB competence-more private information-about policy objectives is desirable while greater competence about operational shocks need not be. When the CB has less private ...
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作者：Nishimura, Hiroki
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：In this paper, we study methods of inferring a decision maker's true preference relation when observed choice data reveal a nontransitive preference relation due to choice mistakes. We propose some sensible properties of such methods and show that these properties characterize a unique rule of inference, called the transitive core. This rule is applied to a variety of nontransitive preference models, such as semiorders on the commodity space, relative discounting time preferences, justifiable ...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Eeckhout, Jan
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of London; University College London; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We analyze the optimal allocation of experts to teams, where experts differ in the precision of their information, and study the assortative matching properties of the resulting assignment. The main insight is that in general it is optimal to diversify the composition of the teams, ruling out positive assortative matching. This diversification leads to negative assortative matching when teams consist of pairs of experts. And when experts' signals are conditionally independent, all teams have s...
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作者：Bardhi, Arjada; Guo, Yingni
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends on all voters' states. The sender makes the most demanding voters indifferent between decisions, while the more lenient voters strictly benefit from persuasion. Unde...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Kets, Willemien
作者单位：Open University Israel; University of Oxford
摘要：Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian-Nash equilibr...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We define necessary and sufficient conditions on prices and incomes under which quantity choices can violate SARP (strong axiom of revealed preference) but not WARP (weak axiom of revealed preference). As SARP extends WARP by additionally imposing transitivity on the revealed preference relation, this effectively defines the conditions under which transitivity adds bite to the empirical analysis. For finite data sets, our characterization takes the form of a triangular condition that must hold...
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作者：Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also show how this...
