Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2717
• 发表日期: 2018-05-01
• 页码: 761-793
• 关键词: Matching with constraints; medical residency matching; school choice; STABILITY; strategy-proofness; matching with contracts; hierarchy

摘要

Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constraints and a matching problem with contracts.