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作者：Azar, Pablo D.; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Collecting and processing large amounts of data is becoming increasingly crucial in our society. We model this task as evaluating a function f over a large vector x = (x(1), ..., x(n)), which is unknown, but drawn from a publicly known distribution X. In our model, learning each component of the input x is costly, but computing the output f(x) has zero cost once x is known. We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to delegate the evaluation of f to an agent whose cost of learning any ...
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作者：Liu, Heng
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper addresses the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classica...
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作者：Stovall, John E.
作者单位：Brigham Young University
摘要：We model a decision maker who anticipates being tempted but is also uncertain about what is normatively best. Our model is an extended version of Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) with three time periods: in the ex ante period, the agent chooses a set of menus; in the interim period, she chooses a menu from this set; in the final period, she chooses from the menu. We posit axioms from the ex ante perspective. Our main axioms on preference state that the agent prefers flexibility in the ex ante peri...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Cambridge
摘要：We study chip-strategy equilibria in two-player repeated games. Intuitively, in these equilibria, players exchange favors by taking individually suboptimal actions if these actions create a gain for the opponent larger than the player's loss from taking them. In exchange, the player who provides a favor implicitly obtains from the opponent a chip that entitles the player to receiving a favor at some future date. Players are initially endowed with a number of chips, and a player who runs out of...
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作者：Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We investigate equilibrium bidding in first-price auctions with asymmetric reserve prices. For example, the auctioneer may set a low reserve price for one subset of bidders and a high reserve price for others. When used to pursue a distributional objective, lowering the reserve price for some bidders channels benefits toward marginal agents in the favored group and does not adversely impact nonfavored bidders whose reserve price is unchanged. Even in symmetric environments, when the valuation ...
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：When is a mechanism designer justified in only asking for ordinal information about preferences? Simple examples show that even if the planner's goal (expressed by a social choice correspondence (SCC)) depends only on ordinal information, eliciting cardinal information may help with incentives. However, if agents may be uncertain about their own cardinal preferences, then a strong robustness requirement can justify the focus on ordinal mechanisms. Specifically, when agents' preferences over pu...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Cologne
摘要：A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is solvable if there is a strategy-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e., that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: Either there are no ties or th...
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作者：Wagner, Peter A.
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper considers a timing game in which heterogeneously informed agents have the option to delay an investment strategically to learn about its uncertain return from the experience of others. I study the effects of information exchange through strategic delay on long-run beliefs and outcomes. Investment decisions are delayed when the information structure prohibits informational cascades. When there is only moderate inequality in the distribution of information, equilibrium beliefs converg...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in which the monitoring cost is small but still significantly higher than the stage payoff. We characterize the limit set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs as the monitoring cost tends to 0. It turns out ...
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作者：Auster, Sarah
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; European University Institute
摘要：A buyer makes an offer to a privately informed seller for a good of uncertain quality. Quality determines both the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation, and the buyer evaluates each contract according to its worst-case performance over a set of probability distributions. This paper demonstrates that the contract that maximizes the minimum payoff over all possible probability distributions of quality is a screening menu that separates all types, whereas the optimal contract for any give...
