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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：University of Surrey; University of Vienna
摘要：In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equili...
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作者：Marx, Philip; Schummer, James
作者单位：Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider the pricing problem of a platformthat matches heterogeneous agents using match-contingent fees. Absent prices, agents on the short side of such markets capture relatively greater surplus than those on the long side (Ashlagi et al. 2017). Nevertheless we show that the platform need not bias its price allocation toward either side. With independently drawn preferences, optimal price allocation decisions are independent of market size or imbalance; furthermore, changes in the optimal ...
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作者：Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Nesterov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Lausanne; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：Dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admissions rules in recent years. As the main motivation for these reforms, the policymakers cited the strategic flaws of the rules in place: students had incentives to game the system. However, after the reforms, almost none of the new rules became strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that the rules used after the reforms are less prone to gaming according to a criterion called strategic ...
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作者：Ceron, Federica; Gonzalez, Stephane
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2
摘要：We axiomatically study voting rules without making any assumption on the ballots that voters are allowed to cast. In this setting, we characterize the family of endorsement rules, which includes approval voting and the plurality rule, via the imposition of three normative conditions. The first condition is the well known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, unbiasedness, roughly requires social outcomes not to be biased toward particular candidates or voters; the last one...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Queensland
摘要：The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit-free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotic...
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作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Xu, Yan
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Vienna
摘要：This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms-top-flop and threshold betting-to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide microeconomic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other ...
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作者：Akin, Sumeyra
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and...
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作者：Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against one another. Applications of the value in economics have been rare, at least in part because the existing definition (for games with more than two players) consists of an ad hoc scheme that does no...
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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We investigate how information goods are priced and diffused over links in a network. A new equivalence relation between nodes captures the effects of network architecture and locations of sellers on the division of profits, and characterizes the topology of competing (and potentially overlapping) diffusion paths. Sellers indirectly appropriate profits over intermediation chains from buyers in their equivalence classes. Links within the same class constitute bottlenecks for information diffusi...
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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana R.
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I study a class of macroeconomic models in which all firms can costlessly choose any price at each date from an interval (indexed to last period's price level) that includes a positive lower bound. I prove three results that are valid for any such half-closed interval (regardless of how near zero the left endpoint is). First, given any output sequence that is uniformly bounded from above by the moneyless equilibrium output level, that bounded output sequence is an equilibrium outcome for a (po...
