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作者：Manzano, Carolina; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：Universitat Rovira i Virgili; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of trade...
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作者：Kushnir, Alexey, I; Lokutsievskiy, Lev, V
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Russian Academy of Sciences; Steklov Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences
摘要：We provide sufficient conditions for a monotone function with a finite set of outcomes to be cyclically monotone. Using these conditions, we show that any monotone function defined on the domain of gross substitutes is cyclically monotone. The result also extends to the domain of generalized gross substitutes and complements.
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作者：Li, Yunan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget-constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two-stage scheme. First, agents report their budgets, receive cash transfers, and decide whether to enter a lottery over the good. Second, recipients of the good can sell it on a resale market but must pay a sales tax. Low-budget agents receive a hi...
