Information aggregation in competitive markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Siga, Lucas; Mihm, Maximilian
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3559
• 发表日期: 2021-01-01
• 页码: 161-196
• 关键词: Auctions; betweenness; competitive markets; information aggregation; rational expectations equilibrium; C72; D44; D82; D83; G14

摘要

We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information-the betweenness property-that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.