Delegating learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi
• 署名单位: Universidad de Chile; Xiamen University; University Diego Portales
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4191
• 发表日期: 2021-05-01
• 页码: 571-603
• 关键词: Private learning; DELEGATION; DELAYS; deadlines; COMMITMENT; cheap talk; D82; D83

摘要

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning gives rise to the trade-off between how much information to acquire and how promptly it is reflected in the decision. We discuss implications on learning delegation for distinct organizations.