Agendas in legislative decision-making

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Horan, Sean
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2618
• 发表日期: 2021-01-01
• 页码: 235-274
• 关键词: Majority voting; sophisticated voting; agendas; committees; implementation; C72; D02; D71; D72

摘要

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats: the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features-history-independence and persistence-are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order-of-voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas.