Subgame-perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3243
• 发表日期: 2021-11-01
• 页码: 1221-1248
• 关键词: Existence; subgame-perfect equilibrium; infinite-action games; stochastic games; public randomization; C72; C73

摘要

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be decorrelated to produce a payoff-equivalent SPE of the original game. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun (2020) on existence of SPE without public randomization, which in turn yields equilibrium existence for stochastic games with weakly continuous state transitions.