Communication with forgetful liars

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4154
• 发表日期: 2021-05-01
• 页码: 605-638
• 关键词: Forgetful liars; lie detection; analogy-based expectations; cheap talk

摘要

I consider multiround cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium distribution of lies aggregated over all possible realizations of the states. The approach is used to shed light on when the full truth is almost surely elicited, and when multiple lies can arise in equilibrium. Elaborations are proposed to shed light on why nontrivial communication protocols are used in criminal investigations.