Relational communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hongyi
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3734
• 发表日期: 2021-11-01
• 页码: 1391-1430
• 关键词: Strategic communication; RELATIONAL CONTRACTS; C73; D82; D83

摘要

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision-making is disciplined by pooling states where she is most tempted to defect.