2期

最新文章

• The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions AI翻译
  作者：Schlegel, Jan Christoph
  作者单位：City St Georges, University of London
  摘要：Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility and in the presence of frictions. While our results are developed in a trading network model, they also imply analogous (and new) results for exchange economies with combinatorial demand and for two-side...
• (Bad) reputation in relational contracting AI翻译
  作者：Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew; Pai, Mallesh M.
  作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto; Rice University
  摘要：Motivated by markets for expertise, we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with the risky arm. However, only the high type arm can generate value for the principal. Our main insight is that reputational incentives can be exceedingly strong unless both players coordinate on maximally i...
• Games with switching costs and endogenous references AI翻译
  作者：Guney, Begum; Richter, Michael
  作者单位：Ozyegin University; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
  摘要：We introduce a game-theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one-player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are ...
• Indifference, indecisiveness, experimentation, and stochastic choice AI翻译
  作者：Ok, Efe A.; Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
  作者单位：New York University; New York University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
  摘要：Among the reasons behind the choice behavior of an individual taking a stochastic form are her potential indifference or indecisiveness between certain alternatives, and/or her willingness to experiment in the sense of occasionally deviating from choosing a best alternative to give a try to other options. We introduce methods of identifying if and when a stochastic choice model may be thought of as arising due to any one of these three reasons. Each of these methods furnishes a natural way of ...
• Two-stage majoritarian choice AI翻译
  作者：Koran, Sean; Sprumont, Yves
  作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Deakin University
  摘要：We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final choice from the shortlist. Rules in this class are characterized by four properties: two classical rationality requirements (Sen's Expansion Consistency and Manzini and Mariotti's Weak WARP); and adaptati...
• A common-value auction with state-dependent participation AI翻译
  作者：Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher
  作者单位：University of Bonn; Northwestern University
  摘要：This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a pooling type-with high probability, the winning bid is the same across states and is below the ex ante expected value-or of a partially revealing type-with no significant atoms in the winning bid distribution and an expected winn...
• Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk AI翻译
  作者：Balbus, Lukasz; Dziewulski, Pawel; Reffett, Kevin; Wozny, Lukasz
  作者单位：University of Zielona Gora; University of Sussex; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Warsaw School of Economics
  摘要：We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its existence, and determine comparative statics of equilibrium paths and the steady-state invariant distributions to which they converge. Finally, we provide numerous applications of our results including: dyna...
• What were you thinking? Decision theory as coherence test AI翻译
  作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry
  作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Yale University
  摘要：Decision theory can be used to test the logic of decision making-one may ask whether a given set of decisions can be justified by a decision-theoretic model. Indeed, in principal-agent settings, such justifications may be required-a manager of an investment fund may be asked what beliefs she used when valuing assets and a government may be asked whether a portfolio of rules and regulations is coherent. In this paper we ask which collections of uncertain-act evaluations can be simultaneously ju...
• Correction to Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs AI翻译
  作者：Bose, Abhigyan; Roy, Souvik
  作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
  摘要：Theorem 1 in Bhargava, Majumdar, and Sen (2015) provides a necessary condition for a social choice function to be locally robust ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible with respect to a belief system satisfying top-set correlation. In this paper, we provide a counterexample to that theorem and consequently provide a new necessary condition for the same in terms of sequential ordinal nondomination.
• Monologues, dialogues, and common priors AI翻译
  作者：Di Tillio, A.; Lehrer, E.; Samet, D.
  作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
  摘要：The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In each stage of the dialogue, the agents tell each other the probability they ascribe to a fixed event and update their beliefs about the event. To characterize dialogues consistent with a common prior, we...