Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balbus, Lukasz; Dziewulski, Pawel; Reffett, Kevin; Wozny, Lukasz
• 署名单位: University of Zielona Gora; University of Sussex; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Warsaw School of Economics
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4624
• 发表日期: 2022-05-01
• 页码: 725-762
• 关键词: Large games; distributional equilibria; supermodular games; comparative dynamics; non-aggregative games; social interactions; C62; C72; C73

摘要

We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its existence, and determine comparative statics of equilibrium paths and the steady-state invariant distributions to which they converge. Finally, we provide numerous applications of our results including: dynamic models of growth with status concerns, social distance, and paternalistic bequests with endogenous preferences for consumption.