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作者：Doval, Laura
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static markets: an ag...
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Timofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of St Andrews
摘要：We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's marginal utility is quasi-concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender's utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our resu...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Laclau, Marie; Renault, Jerome; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse
摘要：We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further information. We consider environments with general constraints on feasible information disclosure policies. Our main results characterize equilibrium payoffs and strategies of this long information design game a...
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作者：Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Kolb, Aaron
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A strong type has a dominant strategy to continue. In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the weak type plays a mixed strategy that depends only on current stakes and her historical minimum and she builds...
