A common-value auction with state-dependent participation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3733
• 发表日期: 2022-05-01
• 页码: 841-881
• 关键词: Auctions; search; information aggregation; D44; D82

摘要

This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a pooling type-with high probability, the winning bid is the same across states and is below the ex ante expected value-or of a partially revealing type-with no significant atoms in the winning bid distribution and an expected winning bid increasing in the true value. Which of these forms will arise is determined by the likelihood ratio at the top of the signal distribution and the participation across states. We fully characterize this relation and show how the participation pattern determines the extent of information aggregation by the price.