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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Yale University
摘要：Decision theory can be used to test the logic of decision making-one may ask whether a given set of decisions can be justified by a decision-theoretic model. Indeed, in principal-agent settings, such justifications may be required-a manager of an investment fund may be asked what beliefs she used when valuing assets and a government may be asked whether a portfolio of rules and regulations is coherent. In this paper we ask which collections of uncertain-act evaluations can be simultaneously ju...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan
作者单位：Boston College; University of Bonn
摘要：The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which info...
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作者：Chen, Yi
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In this paper, I study the dynamic delegation problem in a principal-agent model wherein an agent privately observes a persistently evolving state, and the principal commits to actions based on the agent's reported state. There are no transfers. While the agent has state-independent preferences, the principal wants to match a state-dependent target. I solve the optimal delegation in closed form, which sometimes prescribes actions that move in the opposite direction of the target. I provide a s...
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作者：Hellwig, Martin F.
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：The paper provides theoretical foundations for models of strategic interdependence under uncertainty that have a continuum of agents and a decomposition of uncertainty into a macro component and an agent-specific micro component, with a law of large numbers for the latter. This macro-micro decomposition of uncertainty is implied by a condition of exchangeability of agents' types, which holds at the level of the prior if and only if it also holds at the level of agents' beliefs, i.e., posterior...
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作者：Alcantud, Jose Carlos R.; Mariotti, Marco; Veneziani, Roberto
作者单位：University of Salamanca; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Deakin University
摘要：Sufficientarianism is a prominent approach to distributive justice in political philosophy and in policy analyses. However, it is virtually absent from the formal normative economics literature. We analyze sufficientarianism axiomatically in the context of the allocation of 0-1 normalized well-being in society. We present three characterizations of the core sufficientarian criterion, which counts the number of agents who attain a good enough level of well-being. The main characterization captu...
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作者：Bose, Abhigyan; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：Theorem 1 in Bhargava, Majumdar, and Sen (2015) provides a necessary condition for a social choice function to be locally robust ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible with respect to a belief system satisfying top-set correlation. In this paper, we provide a counterexample to that theorem and consequently provide a new necessary condition for the same in terms of sequential ordinal nondomination.
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作者：Di Tillio, A.; Lehrer, E.; Samet, D.
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In each stage of the dialogue, the agents tell each other the probability they ascribe to a fixed event and update their beliefs about the event. To characterize dialogues consistent with a common prior, we...
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作者：Amador, Manuel; Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Stanford University
摘要：We analyze the Baron and Myerson (1982) model of regulation under the restriction that transfers are infeasible. Extending techniques from the delegation literature to incorporate an ex post participation constraint, we report sufficient conditions under which optimal regulation takes the form of price-cap regulation. We establish conditions under which the optimal price cap is set at a level such that no types are excluded and show that exclusion of higher cost types can be optimal when these...
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作者：Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz
作者单位：University of Haifa; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the informativeness of signaling in the equilibrium that a test induces depends on the relative informativeness of the test's high and low grades. Consequently, we find that the receiver's preference relati...
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作者：Doval, Laura
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static markets: an ag...
