Dynamically stable matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doval, Laura
• 署名单位: Columbia University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4187
• 发表日期: 2022-05-01
• 页码: 687-724
• 关键词: Dynamic stability; dynamic matching; stable matching; nontransferable utility; externalities; credibility; market design; dynamic arrivals; aftermarkets; sequential assignment; C78; D47

摘要

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents are allowed to form blocking pairs. Second, dynamic matching markets exhibit a form of externality that is not present in static markets: an agent's payoff from remaining unmatched cannot be defined independently of other contemporaneous agents' outcomes. Dynamically stable matchings always exist. Dynamic stability is a necessary condition to ensure timely participation in the economy by ensuring that agents do not strategically delay the time at which they are available to match.