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作者：Hugonnier, Julien; Lester, Benjamin; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study a canonical model of decentralized exchange for a durable good or asset, where agents are assumed to have time-varying, heterogeneous utility types. Whereas the existing literature has focused on the special case of two types, we allow agents' utility to be drawn from an arbitrary distribution. Our main contribution is methodological: we provide a solution technique that delivers a complete characterization of the equilibrium, in closed form, both in and out of the steady state. This ...
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作者：Cordoba, Juan Carlos; Liu, Xiying
作者单位：Iowa State University; Wuhan University
摘要：This article studies socially optimal allocations, from the point of view of a benevolent social planner, in environments characterized by fixed resources, endogenous fertility, and full information. Individuals in our environment are fully rational and altruistic toward their descendants. Our model allows for rich heterogeneity of abilities, preferences for children, and costs of raising children. We show that the planner's optimal allocations are efficient in the sense of Golosov et al. (200...
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作者：Rubinstein, Ariel; Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; New York University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：The jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best suited in the group. A civilized equilibrium is an assignment such that every agent is the strongest in the group of agents consisting of himself and those who wish to be assigned to the object and can be just...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Iwasaki, Kohei; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Osaka; Kyoto University
摘要：This paper develops a model of rational bubbles where trade of an asset takes place through a chain of middlemen. We show that there exists a unique and robust equilibrium, and a bubble can occur due to information frictions in bilateral and decentralized markets. Under reasonable assumptions, the equilibrium price is increasing and accelerating during bubbles although the fundamental value is constant over time. Bubbles may be detrimental to the economy, but any announcement from the central ...
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作者：Pomatto, Luciano
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This paper proposes an epistemic approach. Agents negotiate through offers, and offers are interpreted according to the highest possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed stable if maintaining the current allocation is a rationalizable action for each agent. The main result shows an equivalence between this notion and incomplete-infor...
