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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Timofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of St Andrews
摘要：We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's marginal utility is quasi-concave. Moreover, we show that it is optimal to reveal less information if the sender becomes more risk averse or the sender's utility shifts to the left. Finally, we apply our resu...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Singapore Management University; University of International Business & Economics; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but allow for the use of lotteries and monetary transfers as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994). We unify the two well-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient ...
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作者：Chassang, Sylvain; Kapon, Samuel
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：A principal seeks to efficiently allocate a productive public resource to a number of possible users. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms provide a detail-free way to do so provided users have deep pockets. In practice however, users may have limited resources. We study a dynamic allocation problem in which participants have limited liability: transfers are made ex post, and only if the productive efforts of participants are successful. We show that it is possible to approximate the perform...
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作者：Onuchic, Paula
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I develop a theory of intermediation in a market where agents meet bilaterally to trade and buyers cannot commit to payments. Some agents observe the past trading history of traders in the market. These informed agents can secure trades by punishing traders who previously defaulted. The punishing strategy affects equilibrium prices and determines which trades are hindered by the risk of default. Intermediation is a robust equilibrium feature, generated by asymmetric punishing strategies that y...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：A single seller faces a sequence of buyers with unit demand. The buyers are forward-looking and long-lived. Each buyer has private information about his arrival time and valuation where the latter evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion. Any incentive-compatible mechanism has to induce truth-telling about the arrival time and the evolution of the valuation. We establish that the optimal stationary allocation policy can be implemented by a simple posted price. The truth-telling constra...
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作者：Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output is binary. If the principal's payoff must also satisfy free disposal and the distribution of outputs has the monotone likelihood rati...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Laclau, Marie; Renault, Jerome; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse
摘要：We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further information. We consider environments with general constraints on feasible information disclosure policies. Our main results characterize equilibrium payoffs and strategies of this long information design game a...
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作者：He, Kevin
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：I study endogenous learning dynamics for people who misperceive intertemporal correlations in random sequences. Biased agents face an optimal-stopping problem. They are uncertain about the underlying distribution and learn its parameters from predecessors. Agents stop when early draws are good enough, so predecessors' experiences contain negative streaks but not positive streaks. When agents wrongly expect systematic reversals (the gambler's fallacy), they understate the likelihood of consecut...
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作者：Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Kolb, Aaron
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A strong type has a dominant strategy to continue. In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the weak type plays a mixed strategy that depends only on current stakes and her historical minimum and she builds...
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作者：Nax, Heinrich Harald; Newton, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Zurich; Kyoto University
摘要：Humans differ in their strategic reasoning abilities and in beliefs about others' strategic reasoning abilities. Studying such cognitive hierarchies has produced new insights regarding equilibrium analysis in economics. This paper investigates the effect of cognitive hierarchies on long run behavior. Despite short run behavior being highly sensitive to variation in strategic reasoning abilities, this variation is not replicated in the long run. In particular, when generalized risk dominant str...
