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作者：Zhao, Chen
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I propose an axiomatic framework for belief revision when new information is qualitative, of the form event A is at least as likely as event B. My decision maker need not have beliefs about the joint distribution of the signal she will receive and the payoff-relevant states. I propose three axioms, Exchangeability, Stationarity, and Reduction, to characterize the class of pseudo-Bayesian updating rules. The key axiom, Exchangeability, requires that the order in which the information arrives do...
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作者：Bird, Daniel; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We develop a framework for deriving dynamic monotonicity results in long-term stochastic contracting problems with symmetric information. Specifically, we construct a notion of concave separable activity that encompasses many prevalent contractual components (e.g., wage, effort, level of production, etc.). We then provide a tight condition under which such activities manifest a form of seniority in every contracting problem in which they are present: any change that occurs in the level of the ...
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作者：Schumacher, Heiner; Thysen, Heidi Christina
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We study a principal-agent framework in which the agent forms beliefs about the principal's project based on a misspecified subjective model. She fits this model to the objective probability distribution to predict output under alternative actions. Misspecifications in the subjective model may lead to biased beliefs. However, under mild restrictions, the agent has correct beliefs on the equilibrium path so that the optimal contract is nonexploitative. This allows for a behavioral version of th...
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作者：Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew; Pai, Mallesh M.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto; Rice University
摘要：Motivated by markets for expertise, we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with the risky arm. However, only the high type arm can generate value for the principal. Our main insight is that reputational incentives can be exceedingly strong unless both players coordinate on maximally i...
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作者：Guney, Begum; Richter, Michael
作者单位：Ozyegin University; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We introduce a game-theoretic model with switching costs and endogenous references. An agent endogenizes his reference strategy, and then taking switching costs into account, he selects a strategy from which there is no profitable deviation. We axiomatically characterize this selection procedure in one-player games. We then extend this procedure to multiplayer simultaneous games by defining a Switching Cost Nash Equilibrium (SNE) notion, and prove that (i) an SNE always exists; (ii) there are ...
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作者：Ok, Efe A.; Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
作者单位：New York University; New York University; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：Among the reasons behind the choice behavior of an individual taking a stochastic form are her potential indifference or indecisiveness between certain alternatives, and/or her willingness to experiment in the sense of occasionally deviating from choosing a best alternative to give a try to other options. We introduce methods of identifying if and when a stochastic choice model may be thought of as arising due to any one of these three reasons. Each of these methods furnishes a natural way of ...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew; Piccione, Michele; Zhang, Shengxing
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study the effects of diverse beliefs on equilibrium securitization under risk neutrality. We provide a simple characterization of the optimal securities. Pooling and tranching of assets emerges in equilibrium as a consequence of the traders' diverse beliefs about asset returns. The issuer of securities tranches the asset pool, and traders sort among the tranches according to their beliefs. We show how the traders' disagreement about the correlation of asset returns is a key factor in determ...
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作者：Koran, Sean; Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Deakin University
摘要：We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on a linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first of these relations is used to pare down the set of the feasible alternatives into a shortlist while the second is used to make a final choice from the shortlist. Rules in this class are characterized by four properties: two classical rationality requirements (Sen's Expansion Consistency and Manzini and Mariotti's Weak WARP); and adaptati...
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作者：Delacretaz, David; Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Melbourne; University of Queensland
摘要：We consider general asset market environments in which agents with quasilinear payoffs are endowed with objects and have demands for other agents' objects. We show that if all agents have a maximum demand of one object and are endowed with at most one object, the VCG transfer of each agent is equal to the largest net Walrasian price of this agent. Consequently, the VCG deficit is equal to the sum of the largest net Walrasian prices over all agents. Generally, whenever Walrasian prices exist, t...
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作者：Lauermann, Stephan; Wolinsky, Asher
作者单位：University of Bonn; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a pooling type-with high probability, the winning bid is the same across states and is below the ex ante expected value-or of a partially revealing type-with no significant atoms in the winning bid distribution and an expected winn...
