Information aggregation in Poisson elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan
• 署名单位: Boston College; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3849
• 发表日期: 2022-01-01
• 页码: 1-23
• 关键词: Political economy; voting; information aggregation; C72; D72; D82

摘要

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small.