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作者：Achim, Peter; Knoepfle, Jan
作者单位：University of York - UK; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：A principal incentivizes an agent to maintain compliance and to truthfully announce any breaches of compliance. Compliance is imperfectly controlled by the agent's private effort choices, is partially persistent, and is verifiable by the principal only through costly inspections. We show that in principal-optimal equilibria, the principal enforces maximum compliance using deterministic inspections. Periodic inspection cycles are suspended during periods of self-reported noncompliance, during w...
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作者：Banerjee, Soumen; Chen, Yi-Chun; Sun, Yifei
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; National University of Singapore; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel classification of lies according to their refutability with evidence, the mechanism requires only two agents, accounts for mixed-strategy equilibria, and accommodates evidentiary costs. While monetary t...
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作者：Deng, Shanglyu; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan
作者单位：University of Macau; National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier opponents, but not those of their contemporaneous or future rivals. We establish the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and fully characterize the equilibrium. Ba...
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作者：Ekici, Ozgun
作者单位：Ozyegin University
摘要：We revisit the classical object reallocation problem under strict preferences. When attention is constrained to the set of Pareto-efficient rules, it is known that top trading cycles (TTC) is the only rule that is strategy-proof and individually rational. We relax this constraint and consider pair efficiency. A rule is pair-efficient if it never induces an allocation at which a pair of agents gain from trading their assigned objects. Remarkably, even in the larger set of pair-efficient rules, ...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We provide a shorter proof of the main result in Reny and Perry (2006, Econometrica) by establishing a lower semicontinuity property of auctions as the number of traders goes to infinity, leveraging existence of equilibria in the limit auction. Our proof also eliminates two of the assumptions in their paper.
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作者：Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer's value is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of an infinite-horizon, mechanism-selection game. Despite being able to choose mechanisms, the seller can do no better and no worse than if he chose prices in each period, so that he is subject to Coase's conjecture. Our analysis marries insights from information a...
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作者：Chen, Yiqiu; Moeller, Markus
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bonn
摘要：Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for a public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy-proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need information that is unlikely to be available to them in practice. We model school choice under incomplete information and show that EDA is regret-free truth-telling, which is a weaker incentive property t...
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作者：Patil, Sanket; Salant, Yuval
作者单位：Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore; Northwestern University
摘要：A statistical decision rule is a mapping from data to actions induced by statistical inference on the data. We characterize these rules for data that are chosen strategically in persuasion environments. A designer wishes to persuade a decision maker (DM) to take a particular action and decides how many Bernoulli experiments about a parameter of interest the DM can obtain. After obtaining these data and estimating the parameter value, the DM chooses to take the action if the estimated value exc...
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作者：Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix
作者单位：University of Bonn; Technical University of Munich
摘要：Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred as the collective decision. Relabel the losing ball with the collective decision, put both balls back into the urn, and repeat. Once in a while, relabel a randomly drawn ball with a random collective decision. We prove that the empirical distribution of collective decisions produced by this process approximates a maxim...
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作者：Fabbri, Giorgio; Faggian, Silvia; Freni, Giuseppe
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; INRAE; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Parthenope University Naples
摘要：This study examines the dynamics of the exploitation of a natural resource distributed among and flowing between several nodes connected via a weighted, directed network. The network represents the locations and interactions of the resource nodes. A regulator decides to designate some of the nodes as natural reserves where no exploitation is allowed. The remaining nodes are assigned (one-to-one) to players, who exploit the resource at the node. It is demonstrated how the equilibrium exploitati...
