Direct implementation with evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banerjee, Soumen; Chen, Yi-Chun; Sun, Yifei
• 署名单位: Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; National University of Singapore; University of International Business & Economics
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5015
• 发表日期: 2024-05-01
• 页码: 783-822
• 关键词: Full implementation; hard evidence; mechanism design; C72; D02; D71

摘要

We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel classification of lies according to their refutability with evidence, the mechanism requires only two agents, accounts for mixed-strategy equilibria, and accommodates evidentiary costs. While monetary transfers are used, they are off the equilibrium and can be balanced with three or more agents. In a richer model of evidence due to Kartik and Tercieux (2012a), we establish pure-strategy implementation with two or more agents in a direct revelation mechanism. We also obtain a necessary and sufficient condition on the evidence structure for renegotiation-proof bilateral contracts, based on the classification of lies.