Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yiqiu; Moeller, Markus
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4979
• 发表日期: 2024-05-01
• 页码: 635-666
• 关键词: School choice; matching; efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance; regret; manipulation; stable-dominating; C78; D81; D82; I20

摘要

Efficiency Adjusted Deferred Acceptance Rule (EDA) is a promising candidate mechanism for a public school assignment. A potential drawback of EDA is that it could encourage students to game the system since it is not strategy-proof. However, to successfully strategize, students typically need information that is unlikely to be available to them in practice. We model school choice under incomplete information and show that EDA is regret-free truth-telling, which is a weaker incentive property than strategy-proofness and was introduced by Fernandez (2020). We also show that there is no efficient matching rule that weakly Pareto dominates a stable matching rule and is regret-free truth-telling. Note that the original version of EDA by Kesten (2010) weakly Pareto dominates a stable matching rule, but it is not efficient.