作者：Zhao, Wei; Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Renmin University of China; University of Queensland; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Adelaide; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal's preferred action. We show that there exists an optimal policy, where the principal recommends its most preferred action and discloses information as a reward in the next period, until either this action becomes statically optimal for the agent or t...
作者：Lang, Xu; Mishra, Debasis
作者单位：Shandong University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probability can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a symmetric monotone (strategy-proof) voting rule and by a...
