-
作者：Han, Xiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：In the allocation of indivisible objects under weak priorities, a common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and to randomize over deterministic mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex ante. We propose and study the concept of ex ante fairness for random allocations, extending some key results in the one-sided and two-sided matching markets. It is shown that the set of ex ante fair random allocations forms a complete and distributive lattice und...
-
作者：Pablo Rincon-Zapatero, Juan
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In this paper, we develop a framework to analyze stochastic dynamic optimization problems in discrete time. We obtain new results about the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the Bellman equation through a notion of Banach contractions that generalizes known results for Banach and local contractions. We apply the results obtained to an endogenous growth model and compare our approach with other well-known methods, such as the weighted contraction method, countable local contractions, and...
-
作者：Louis-Sidois, Charles; Musolff, Leon
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We analyze a vote-buying model where the members of a committee vote on a proposal important to a vote buyer. Each member incurs a privately-drawn disutility if the proposal passes. We characterize the cheapest combination of bribes that guarantees the proposal passes in all equilibria. When members vote simultaneously, the number of bribes is at least 50% larger than the number of votes required to pass the proposal (vote threshold). The number of bribes increases with the dispersion of the d...
-
作者：Barthelemy, Jean; Mengus, Eric
作者单位：European Central Bank; Bank of France; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static macroeconomic games, the government can obtain a unique equilibrium with any low level of commitment ability. We finally derive implications for models of bailouts and capital taxation.
-
作者：Bhaskar, V.; Olszewski, Wojciech; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Northwestern University
摘要：We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Our focus is on equilibria that are robust to the addition of small privately observed shocks to the payoffs. Existing constructions of positive-effort equilibria are not robust to such payoff shocks. Allowing for simultaneous cheap-talk announcements makes some effort sustainable in a robust equilibrium, and payoffs can be arbitrarily close to fully e...
-
作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland Baltimore
摘要：We study random joint choice rules, allowing for interdependence of choice across agents. These capture random choice by multiple agents, or a single agent across goods or time periods. Our interest is in separable choice rules, where each agent can be thought of as acting independently of the other. A random joint choice rule satisfies marginality if for every individual choice set, we can determine the individual's choice probabilities over alternatives independently of the other individual'...
-
作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We introduce a model of large many-to-one matching markets with occupational choice where each individual can choose which side of the market to belong to. We show that stable matchings exist under mild assumptions; in particular, both complementarities and externalities can be accommodated. Our model generalizes Greinecker and Kah (2021), which focuses on one-to-one matching and did not allow for occupational choice. Applications include the roommate problem with nonatomic participants, expla...
-
作者：Kambhampati, Ashwin
作者单位：United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; United States Naval Academy
摘要：A principal provides incentives for independent agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown that an anti-informativeness principle holds: very generally, robustly optimal contracts must link the incentive pay of the agents. In symmetric and binary environments, they must exhibit joint performance evaluation-each agent's pay is increasing in the performance of the other.
-
作者：Duraj, Jetlir; He, Kevin
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief about future consumption (news utility) with diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news. Diminishing sensitivity induces a preference over news skewness: gradual bad news, one-shot good news is worse than one-shot resolution, which is in turn worse than gradual good news, one-shot bad news. So the agent's preference between gradual information and one-shot resolution can depend on his consumption ranking ...
-
作者：Pivato, Marcus; Tchouante, Elise Flore
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We consider collective decisions under uncertainty, when agents have generalized Hurwicz preferences, a broad class allowing many different ambiguity attitudes, including subjective expected utility preferences. We consider sequences of acts that are almost-objectively uncertain in the sense that asymptotically, all agents almost agree about the probabilities of the underlying events. We introduce a Pareto axiom, which applies only to asymptotic preferences along such almost-objective sequence...
