Robust performance evaluation of independent agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kambhampati, Ashwin
• 署名单位: United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; United States Naval Academy
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5523
• 发表日期: 2024-07-01
• 页码: 1151-1184
• 关键词: Moral hazard; Robustness; teams; D81; D82; D86

摘要

A principal provides incentives for independent agents. The principal cannot observe the agents' actions, nor does she know the entire set of actions available to them. It is shown that an anti-informativeness principle holds: very generally, robustly optimal contracts must link the incentive pay of the agents. In symmetric and binary environments, they must exhibit joint performance evaluation-each agent's pay is increasing in the performance of the other.