Dynamic information preference and communication with diminishing sensitivity over news

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duraj, Jetlir; He, Kevin
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5569
• 发表日期: 2024-07-01
• 页码: 1057-1086
• 关键词: Diminishing sensitivity; news utility; dynamic information; cheap talk; preference over skewness of information; D83; D91

摘要

A Bayesian agent experiences gain-loss utility each period over changes in belief about future consumption (news utility) with diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news. Diminishing sensitivity induces a preference over news skewness: gradual bad news, one-shot good news is worse than one-shot resolution, which is in turn worse than gradual good news, one-shot bad news. So the agent's preference between gradual information and one-shot resolution can depend on his consumption ranking of different states. In a dynamic cheap-talk framework where a benevolent sender communicates the state over multiple periods, the babbling equilibrium is essentially unique when the receiver is not loss averse. Contrary to the commitment case, more loss-averse receivers may enjoy higher news utility in equilibrium. We characterize the family of gradual good-news equilibria when facing such receivers and find that the sender conveys progressively larger pieces of good news.