Optimal sequential contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Toomas, Hinnosaar
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5536
• 发表日期: 2024-01-01
• 页码: 207-244
• 关键词: Contest design; oligopoly; public goods; rent-seeking; R&D

摘要

I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.