Efficient incentives with social preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph
• 署名单位: Technical University of Munich; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5335
• 发表日期: 2024-07-01
• 页码: 975-999
• 关键词: Mechanism design; social preferences; Bayesian implementation; participation constraints; participation stimulation; contests; money pump; C72; C78; D62; D82

摘要

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: Any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex post Pareto-efficient.