Repeated Nash implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic
• 署名单位: University of Queensland; University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1988
• 发表日期: 2017-01-01
• 页码: 249-285
• 关键词: Dynamic monotonicity; Nash implementation; Maskin monotonicity; repeated implementation; repeated games

摘要

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is large or small.