Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolotilin, Anton
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1805
• 发表日期: 2018-05-01
• 页码: 607-635
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; information design; information disclosure; informed receiver

摘要

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I provide conditions under which interval revelation is optimal. Finally, I show that the expected utilities are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information.