Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sobel, Joel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2904
• 发表日期: 2019-01-01
• 页码: 71-102
• 关键词: Supermodularity; dominance; equilibrium selection; C72; D81

摘要

This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implications for equilibrium selection and dynamic stability in games.