Bayesian comparative statics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mekonnen, Teddy; Leal Vizcaino, Rene
• 署名单位: Brown University; Bank of Mexico
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4345
• 发表日期: 2022-01-01
• 页码: 219-251
• 关键词: Supermodular stochastic order; Convex Order; persuasion with many receievers; C44; C61; D42; D81

摘要

We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single-agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. Focusing on supermodular environments, we provide conditions under which a more precise private signal for one agent leads to an increasing-mean spread or a decreasing-mean spread of equilibrium actions for all agents. We apply our comparative statics to information disclosure games between a sender and many receivers and derive sufficient conditions on the primitive payoffs that lead to extremal disclosure of information.