Slow persuasion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Escude, Matteo; Sinander, Ludvig
• 署名单位: Luiss Guido Carli University; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5175
• 发表日期: 2023-01-01
• 页码: 129-162
• 关键词: Persuasion; INFORMATION; gradual; dynamic; viscosity; constrained; C61; C65; C73; D82; D83

摘要

What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a sender provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel viscosity dynamic programming principle, we characterize the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.