Learning by bidding
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hossain, Tanjim
署名单位：
Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00025.x
发表日期：
2008
页码：
509-529
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze a dynamic second-price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who, upon seeing a posted price, learns whether his valuation is above that price. In the essentially unique equilibrium, an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff and bids only in the last period otherwise. An uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally change the price unless the price is above his valuation or he is the high bidder. This model also provides a rationale behind the use of a secret reserve price in private-value settings.
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