Information feedback in first price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Esponda, Ignacio
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00024.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 491-508
• 关键词: 1st-price auctions; collusion; regret; games; MODEL

摘要

I apply the notion of a self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders' perceptions about their strategic environment, and consequently their bidding behavior. In a private values setting, revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs (justifying the assumption of Nash equilibrium). In contrast, in every symmetric SCE of a symmetric, affiliated, private values model, bidding strategies and revenue are (weakly) higher if only the highest bid is revealed. I also consider interdependent valuations and discuss implications for the empirical auction literature.