Accidental death and the rule of joint and several liability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carvell, Daniel; Currie, Janet; MacLeod, W. Bentley
• 署名单位: Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00158.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 51-77
• 关键词: tort reform; multidefendant settlements; economic-theory; malpractice; DAMAGES; IMPACT; incentives; insolvency; insurance; LAW

摘要

Most U.S. states have enacted JSL reform, the move from a regime of joint and several liability (JSL) that allows plaintiffs to claim full recovery from any one of multiple defendants to one where defendants are held liable only for the harm they cause. Contrary to previous theoretical work, we show that JSL reform can increase precaution by judgment proof agent by giving deep pockets an incentive to reduce their own liability by bringing judgment-proof agents into court. This result can help explain our empirical findings showing that JSL reform reduces death rates (and hence increase precaution) for many types of accidents. Together, these results highlight the role that litigation costs and judgment-proof agents play in the functioning of the American tort system.