Hybrid platform model: monopolistic competition and a dominant firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Simon; Defolie, Ozlem Bedre
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European University Institute; European School of Management & Technology
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12478
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 684-718
• 关键词: Intermediation; MARKET

摘要

We model a platform controlling the variety and prices of the products it hosts via a percentage fee on sellers and choosing whether to sell its own products (hybrid mode). We derive a mixed market demand system for differentiated products with monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable platform product range. The hybrid platform steers consumers toward its products by charging higher seller fees than pure marketplace. This insidious steering intensifies the larger the platform's product footprint. Hybrid mode harms consumers compared to pure marketplace unless fringe entry is sufficiently inelastic.