Promoting a reputation for quality
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hauser, Daniel N.
署名单位：
Aalto University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12460
发表日期：
2024
页码：
112-139
关键词：
摘要：
I model a firm that invests in the quality of its product and influences how that quality is disclosed. The firm can promote its product; at random intervals it can disclose quality for a cost. At low reputations, promotion allows a firm to reestablish itself and the firm invests to take advantage of this. However, the ability to promote crowds out incentives for investment at high reputations generated by other information sources, in particular information that is generated whenever the firm is selling a low quality product, leading to reputation cycles in settings where high reputations would have otherwise persisted.
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