Herding in equity crowdfunding

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Astebro, Thomas; Fernandez, Manuel; Lovo, Stefano; Vulkan, Nir
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Universidad de los Andes - Chile; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12474
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 403-441
• 关键词: behavior; uncertainty; mechanisms

摘要

We build a model of equity crowdfunding that incorporates the two major funding models: all-or-nothing (AoN) and keep-it-all (KIA). Both informed and uninformed investors arrive sequentially and rationally choose whether and how much to invest. The KIA solution turns out to be a reduced version of AoN without signalling. We test predictions using data from a leading European equity crowdfunding platform and find support. Results are consistent with rational information aggregation. However, negative information cascades may still appear. The AoN crowdfunding mechanism might therefore fail to finance a nonnegligible percentage of positive NPV projects.