Employee referrals as a screening device

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ekinci, Emre
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12141
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 688-708
• 关键词: old boy networks; social networks; call center; incentives; job; performance; promotion; CONTRACTS; earnings; TENURE

摘要

This article develops a career-concerns model to examine the screening function of employee referrals. First, I show that employees' reputational concerns provide them with an incentive to refer high-ability applicants. This result explains how firms that offer fixed payments, rather than bonuses contingent on the referral's posthire performance, can elicit high-ability referrals from their employees. Second, I consider the promotion competition as a potential mechanism that creates a conflict of interest between a firm and its employees concerning referral hiring. I show that referrals may still serve a screening function even when the promotion competition distorts employees' referral decisions.