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作者：Giulietti, Corrado; Tonin, Mirco; Vlassopoulos, Michael
作者单位：University of Southampton; Free University of Bozen-Bolzano
摘要：We examine whether racial discrimination exists in access to public services in the United States. We carry out an email correspondence study in which we pose simple queries to more than 19,000 local public service providers. We find that emails from putatively black senders are almost 4 percentage points less likely to receive an answer compared to emails signed with a white-sounding name. Moreover, responses to queries coming from black names are less likely to have a cordial tone. Further t...
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作者：Gneezy, Uri; Saccardo, Silvia; van Veldhuizen, Roel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We experimentally investigate behavioral drivers of bribery, focusing on the role of self-interest, reciprocity, and moral costs associated with distorting judgment. In our laboratory experiment, two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her decision. An experiment in an...
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作者：Michaels, Guy; Rauch, Ferdinand; Redding, Stephen J.
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Oxford; Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We develop a new methodology for quantifying the tasks undertaken within occupations using over 3,000 verbs from more than 12,000 occupational descriptions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOTs). Using micro data from the United States from 1880 to 2000, we find an increase in the employment share of interactive occupations within sectors over time that is larger in metro areas than nonmetro areas. We interpret these findings using a model in which reductions in transport and communic...
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作者：Harstad, Bard; Lancia, Francesco; Russo, Alessia
作者单位：University of Oslo; University of Salerno; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, that is, the Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect equilibrium, when countries are insufficiently patient for folk theorems to be relevant. Relative to the first best, the best equilibrium requires countries to overinvest in technologies that are green, that is, strategic substitutes for polluting, but to underinvest in adaptation and brown technologies, that is,...
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作者：Asturias, Jose; Garcia-Santana, Manuel; Ramos, Roberto
作者单位：Qatar Foundation (QF); Georgetown University in Qatar; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Banco de Espana
摘要：A significant amount of resources is spent every year on the improvement of transportation infrastructure in developing countries. In this paper, we investigate the effects of one such large project, the Golden Quadrilateral in India. We do so using a model of internal trade with variable markups. In contrast to the previous literature, our model incorporates several channels through which transportation infrastructure affects welfare. In particular, the model accounts for gains stemming from ...
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作者：Frimmel, Wolfgang; Halla, Martin; Paetzold, Joerg
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; Johannes Kepler University Linz; Salzburg University
摘要：Does tax evasion run in the family? To answer this question, we study the case of the commuter tax allowance in Austria. This allowance is designed as a step function of the distance between the residence and the workplace, creating sharp discontinuities at each bracket threshold. It turns out that the distance to the next higher bracket is a strong determinant of compliance. The match of different administrative data sources allows us to observe actual compliance behavior with little error at...
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作者：Hansman, Christopher; Hjort, Jonas; Leon, Gianmarco
作者单位：Imperial College London; Columbia University; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Industrial regulations are typically designed with a particular policy objective and set of firms in mind. When input-output linkages connect firms across sectors, such piecemeal regulations may worsen externalities elsewhere in the economy. Using daily administrative and survey data, we show that in Peru's industrial fishing sector, the world's largest, air pollution from downstream (fishmeal) manufacturing plants caused 55,000 additional respiratory hospital admissions per year as a conseque...
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作者：Fahn, Matthias; Merlo, Valeria; Wamser, Georg
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen
摘要：Existing theories of a firm's optimal capital structure seem to fail in explaining why many healthy and profitable firms rely heavily on equity financing, even though benefits associated with debt (like tax shields) appear to be high and the bankruptcy risk low. This holds in particular for firms that show a strong commitment toward their workforce and are popular among employees. We demonstrate that such financing behavior may be driven by implicit arrangements made between a firm and its man...
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作者：Mrazova, Monika; Neary, J. Peter
作者单位：University of Geneva; University of Oxford
摘要：We characterize how firms select between alternative ways of serving a market. First-order selection effects, whether firms enter or not, are extremely robust. Second-order ones, how firms serve a market conditional on entry, are much less so: more efficient firms select the entry mode with lower market-access costs if firms' maximum profits are supermodular in production and market-access costs, but not necessarily otherwise. We derive microfoundations for supermodularity in a range of canoni...
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作者：Borra, Cristina; Gonzalez, Libertad; Sevilla, Almudena
作者单位：University of Sevilla; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We take advantage of a unique natural experiment to provide new, credible evidence on the health consequences of scheduling birth early for non-medical reasons. In May 2010, the Spanish government announced that a (sic)2,500 universal baby bonus would stop being paid to babies born after December 31, 2010. Using administrative data from birth certificates and hospital records, we find that about 2,000 families shifted their date of birth from January 2011 to December 2010 (out of 9,000 weekly ...
