COMPLIANCE TECHNOLOGY AND SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harstad, Bard; Lancia, Francesco; Russo, Alessia
• 署名单位: University of Oslo; University of Salerno; BI Norwegian Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy055
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1-29
• 关键词: research-and-development; repeated games; capacity; COOPERATION; investments; duopoly; POLICY; entry; cost

摘要

This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, that is, the Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect equilibrium, when countries are insufficiently patient for folk theorems to be relevant. Relative to the first best, the best equilibrium requires countries to overinvest in technologies that are green, that is, strategic substitutes for polluting, but to underinvest in adaptation and brown technologies, that is, strategic complements to polluting. Technological transfers and spillovers might discourage investments but can be necessary to motivate compliance with emissions when countries are heterogeneous.