BRIBERY: BEHAVIORAL DRIVERS OF DISTORTED DECISIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gneezy, Uri; Saccardo, Silvia; van Veldhuizen, Roel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy043
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 917-946
• 关键词: corruption; procurement; deception; fairness

摘要

We experimentally investigate behavioral drivers of bribery, focusing on the role of self-interest, reciprocity, and moral costs associated with distorting judgment. In our laboratory experiment, two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her decision. An experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. These findings imply that our participants are influenced by bribes out of self-interest, and not because of a desire to reciprocate. Further evidence shows that self-interest guides decisions to a greater extent when referees have scope for avoiding the moral costs associated with distorting judgment. As a result, limiting referees' ability to form self-serving evaluations can significantly reduce the effectiveness of bribes.